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As pointed out by Searle (1987), sub-
jectivity and intentionality have always
been defined as basic characteristics of
consciousness. Both of them are also
needed in order to determine whether
a person is a (self-)murderer or not: a
legal report of the consciousness state
should verify whether at that particular
moment a person was subjectively and
intentionally able to decide on his/her
own actions. Despite the relevance of this
assessment, at the moment the scien-
tific community is not providing a uni-
fied definition of consciousness (Velmans,
2009). This lack is particularly relevant
for psychopathology, since consciousness
problems have been connected to sev-
eral clinical pathologies. In the past, very
scarce attention has been paid to the
clinical assessment of consciousness, and
research was mainly devoted to disorders
of consciousness. However, assessment of
consciousness has been acknowledged as
being extremely relevant for psychiatric
pathologies too, as a way of prevent-
ing self-harming and suicidal behavior.
Several pathologies could result in suici-
dal behavior, such as schizophrenia (Bob
and Mashour, 2011), substance-related
disorders (Bortelote et al., 2004), post-
traumatic stress disorder (O’Brien and
Nutt, 1998), eating disorders (Favaro and
Santonastaso, 1995), and others. Literature
has usually divided people linked to
self-harm into two branches: those who
committed suicidal actions with a specific
intention (intentional suicides, ISP), and
those who died as a consequence of a risky
behavior, without a clear suicidal intention
(risky behavior people, RBP).
The ISP sample is mainly composed
by people who are/were suffering from
either major or mixed depressive episodes
(Schneider, 2003; Bortelote et al., 2004).
These patients usually focus attention on
single aspects of their perception, con-
cerning inner experiences (Ringel, 1953)
or circumstances (i.e., confrontation with
life or traumatic events as well as devel-
opmental tasks: Tschiesner et al., 2012).
Patients of this group perceive and elab-
orate only specific contents according to
their symptoms, and this may be viewed
also as a restriction of consciousness
(Ringel, 1953; Pöldinger, 1968). The con-
tent of their phenomenal consciousness
consists, on the one hand, mainly of emo-
tional experiences in many cases rated
more intense as normal, and, on the other
hand, of a constriction in perceiving alter-
native ways of behavior or reaction in
difficult situations. Therefore, a dyspho-
ric mood characterizes consciousness and
triggers intentions of the same conno-
tation, forcing people to direct aggres-
sion toward themselves (Ringel, 1953).
Rottenberg et al. (2006) have shown this
congruency between mood and behavior
in depressive patients, a fact that, in turn,
would explain why it is so difficult to defer
their attention from their negative emo-
tional status, which could lead them to
carry out suicidal actions. Self-harming
behavior is therefore one of the aims of ISP,
and consistent with, and caused by, their
constricted consciousness.
The RBP category includes people that
are for example looking for thrills doing
extreme sports or putting themselves
in dangerous situations, or doing their
official jobs like policemen, paramedics,
soldiers, or firefighters (Gomà-i-Freixanet,
1995; Tschiesner, 2012). The drive for
situations characterized by novelty and
intensity has been described in the
Sensations Seeking sub-construct “thrill
and adventure seeking” (Zuckerman,
2007). Sensation-seekers are described as
showing a low level of arousal, and they try
to increase it, in an unconscious way, by
doing extreme sports, consuming drugs,
attending religious rituals and so on.
This way of controlling arousal through
intense and novel stimuli (Arnett, 1995;
Zuckerman, 2007) has been indicated as
the main indirect cause for assuming risks
and provoking accidents. Accordingly,
Schneider and Rheinberg (2003) argued
that the aim of risky behavior—by doing
risky activities–is not the danger in itself,
but the ability to keep control in dan-
gerous situations. Keeping control in a
desperate situation like climbing a wall
without a rope is linked with pleasure
(Balint, 1959). Rephrasing, we may say
that RBP seek to manage themselves in
extreme situations, in which normal peo-
ple wouldn’t be able to do so. This way,
RBP are intentionally targeting on the
performance but not the correlated risks,
the latter being part of the whole situa-
tion, but excluded from conscious analysis.
The access to consciousness is influenced
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not only by vigilance (Overgaard and
Overgaard, 2010), but also by the content
itself: in RBP, only part of the intention
is represented within consciousness (the
one related to the proximal activity, but
not the one related to arousal and to
danger). One question that clinical prac-
tice poses to basic research concerns the
mechanism that selects certain aspects and
inhibits others from being accessed by
consciousness.
Whereas harm and death in ISP are
contents within consciousness, RBP do
not include risk as a possible cause
of harm or death. The former report
to have intentionally attempted to carry
out a suicidal action, the latter would
deny it. These cases seem to differ with
regard to the presence/absence of inten-
tionality. The mood makes the difference:
while ISP’s mood is characterized by dys-
phoria and leads to suicidal behavior,
RBP’s mood is guided by pleasure felt in
extreme situations. However, in our opin-
ion, self-harmful behavior in both sam-
ples is influenced by the limited content
in consciousness and determined by peo-
ple’s affection and needs, not only by
vigilance.
The importance of consciousness and
intentionality assessment has obvious
implications on several applications, such
as law (Rigoni et al., 2010). In our opin-
ion, basic research on relevant clinical
or subclinical samples like these could
be very helpful for elucidating mecha-
nisms of consciousness. In addition, this
research would have an immediate impact
on assessment and prevention of these
self-harming behaviors.
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